I will provide 4 question and a source for each question. You could only use what I provide. You could quote from the source but the question have to be answered in your own words . Write as though yo

I will provide 4 question and a source for each question. You could only use what I provide. You could quote from the source but the question have to be answered in your own words . Write as though yo
Hey so I have midterm for philosophy. I will update the due date on when it’ s due . Theirs 4 questions . Each question has a source that must ONLY BE USED FOR THAT QUESTION. NO OUTSIDE INFORMATION PLEASE. If you quote from the text, you’ll have to explain what you’re saying, how you interpreted it, and so on. The goal should be to demonstrate in your own words that you comprehend the concepts at hand. Write as if you’re explaining something to someone who isn’t familiar with the subject. your comments will be judged on how well and comprehensively you answered the questions. Questions and the source (provided) 1. What does Cultural Relativism claim about ethics? How does Rachels argue against it and for moral universality? Source – The Challenge of Cultural Relativism by James Rachels 1. Why is trust important in business, acco rding to Tamar Frankel? How would morality serve as a barrier to abuses of trust? Source -TR UST, HONESTY AND ETHICS IN BUSINESS byTamar Frankel 1. What is the idea of the Social Contract? How can it be seen as relating to a Prisoner’s Dilemma pertaining to morality? Source – The Social Contract Theory Wherever law ends, tyranny begins . . . John Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690) 1. How does Nozick think about justice? Describe his views as they relate to the notions of entitlement and liberty. What is his point in talking about Wilt Chamberlain? source -Nozick justice
I will provide 4 question and a source for each question. You could only use what I provide. You could quote from the source but the question have to be answered in your own words . Write as though yo
Distributive Justice Robert Nozick From Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 149-182, with omissions. Copyright @ 1974 by Basic Books, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Basic Books, a subsidiary of Perseus Books Group, LLC. The minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Any state more extensive violates people’s rights. Yet many persons have put forth reasons purporting to justify a more extensive state. It is impossible within the compass of this book to examine all the reasons that have been put forth. Therefore, I shall focus upon those generally acknowledged to be most weighty and influential, to see precisely wherein they fail. In this chapter we consider the claim that a more extensive state is justified, because necessary (or the best instrument) to achieve distributive justice; in the next chapter we shall take up diverse other claims. The term “distributive justice” is not a neutral one. Hearing the term “distribution,” most people presume that some thing or mechanism uses some principle or criterion to give out a supply of things. Into this process of distributing shares some error may have crept. So it is an open question, at least, whether redistribution should take place; whether we should do again what has already been done once, though poorly. However, we are not in the position of children who have been given portions of pie by someone who now makes last minute adjustments to rectify careless cutting. There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how t hey are to be doled out. What each person gets, he gets from others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift. In a free society, diverse persons control different resources, and new holdings arise out of the voluntary exchanges and actions of persons. There is no more a distributing or distribution of shares than there is a distributing of mates in a society in which persons choose whom they shall marry. The total result is the product of many individual decisions which the different individuals involved are entitled to make. Some uses of the term “distribution,” it is true, do not imply a previous distributing appropriately judged by some criterion (for example, “probability distribution”); nevertheless, despite the title of this chapter, it would be best to use a terminology that clearly is neutral. We shall speak of people’s holdings; a principle of justice in holdings describes (part of) what justice tells us (requires) about holdings. I shall state first what I take to be the correct view about justice in holdings, and then turn to the discussion of alternate views. Section 1 The Entitlement Theory The subject of justice in holdings consists of three major topics. The first is the original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld things. This includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be held, the process, or processes, by which unheld things may come to be held, the things that may come to be held by these processes, the extent of what comes to be held by a particular process, and so on. We shall refer to the complicated truth about this topic, which we shall not formulate here, as the principle of justice in acquisition. The second topic concerns the transfer of holdings from one person to another. By what processes may a person transfer holdings to another? How may a person acquire a holding from another who holds it? Under this topic come general descriptions of voluntary exchange, and gift and (on the other hand) fraud, as well as reference to particular conventional details fixed upon in a given society. The complicated truth about this subject (with placeholders for conventional details) we shall call the principle of justice in transfer. (And we shall suppose it also includes principles governing how a person may divest himself of a holding, passing it into an unheld state.) If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings. 1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. 3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution. A distribution is just if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means. The legitimate means of moving from one distribution to another are specified by the principle of justice in transfer. The legitimate first “moves” are specified by the principle of justice in acquisition. Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just. The means of change specified by the principle of justice in transfer preserve justice. As correct rules of inference are truth-preserving, and any conclusion deduced via repeated application of such rules from only true premisses is itself true, so the means of transition from one situation to another specified by the principle of justice in transfer are justice-preserving, and any situation actually arising from repeated transitions in accordance with the principle from a just situation is itself just. The parallel between justice-preserving transformations and truth-preserving transformations illuminates where it fails as well as where it holds. That a conclusion could have been deduced by truth-preserving means from premisses that are true suffices to show its truth. That from a just situation a situation could have arisen via justice-preserving means does not suffice to show its justice. The fact that a thief’s victims voluntarily could have presented him with gifts does not entitle the thief to his ill-gotten gains. Justice in holdings is historical; it depends upon what actually has happened. We shall return to this point later. Not all actual situations are generated in accordance with the two principles of justice in holdings: the principle of justice in acquisition and the principle of justice in transfer. Some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their product and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from competing in exchanges. None of these are permissible modes of transition from one situation to another. And some persons acquire holdings by means not sanctioned by the principle of justice in acquisition. The existence of past injustice (previous violations of the first two principles of justice in holdings) raises the third major topic under justice in holdings: the rectification of injustice in holdings. If past injustice has shaped present holdings in various ways, some identifiable and some not, what now, if anything, ought to be done to rectify these injustices? What obligations do the performers of injustice have toward those whose position is worse than it would have been had the injustice not been done? Or, than it would have been had compensation been paid promptly? How, if at all, do things change if the beneficiaries and those made worse off are not the direct parties in the act of injustice, but, for example, their descendants? Is an injustice done to someone whose holding was itself based upon an unrectified injustice? How far back must one go in wiping clean the historical slate of injustices? What may victims of injustice permissibly do in order to rectify the injustices being done to them, including the many injustices done by persons acting through their government? I do not know of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated treatment of such issues. Idealizing greatly, let us suppose theoretical investigation will produce a principle of rectification. This principle uses historical information about previous situations and injustices done in them (as defined by the first two principles of justice and rights against interference), and information about the actual course of events that flowed from these injustices, until the present, and it yields a description (or descriptions) of holdings in the society. The principle of rectification presumably will make use of its best estimate of subjunctive information about what would have occurred (or a probability distribution over what might have occurred, using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken place. If the actual description of holdings turns out not to be one of the descriptions yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded must be realized. The general outlines of the theory of justice in holdings are that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principle of rectification of injustice (as specified by the first two principles). If each person’s holdings are just, then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just. To turn these general outlines into a specific theory we would have to specify the details of each of the three principles of justice in holdings: the principle of acquisition of holdings, the principle of transfer of holdings, and the principle of rectification of violations of the first two principles. I shall not attempt that task here (Locke’s principle of justice in acquisition is discussed below.)… . How Liberty Upsets Patterns It is not clear how those holding alternative conceptions of distributive justice can reject the entitlement conception of justice in holdings. For suppose a distribution favored by one of these non-entitlement conceptions is realized. Let us suppose it is your favorite one and let us call this distribution D 1; perhaps everyone has an equal share, perhaps shares vary in accordance with some dimension you treasure. Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. (Also suppose contracts run only for a year, with players being free agents.) He signs the following sort of contract with a team: In each home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of admission goes to him. (We ignore the question of whether he is “gouging” the owners, letting them look out for themselves.) The season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team’s games; they buy their tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty-five cents of their admission price into a special box with Chamberlain’s name on it. They are excited about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to them. Let us suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the average income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this income? Is this new distribut i on D 2, unjust? If so, why? There is no question about whether each of the people was entitled to the control over the resources they held in D,; because that was the distribution (your favorite) that (for the purposes of argument) we assumed was acceptable. Each of these persons chose to give twenty-five cents of their money to Chamberlain. They could have spent it on going to the movies, or on candy bars, or on copies of Dissent magazine, or of Monthly Review But they all, at least one million of them, converged on giving it to Wilt Chamberlain in exchange for watching him play basketball. If D, was a just distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D 2, transferring parts of their shares they were given under D, (what was it for if not to do something with?), isn’t D, also just? If the people were entitled to dispose of the resources to which they were entitled (under D,), didn’t this include their being entitled to give it to, or exchange it with, Wilt Chamberlain? Can anyone else complain on grounds of justice? Each other person already has his legitimate share under D 1. Under D p there is nothing that anyone has that anyone else has a claim of justice against. After someone transfers something to Wilt Chamberlain, third parties still have their legitimate shares; their shares are not changed. By what process could such a transfer among two persons give rise to a legitimate claim of distributive justice on a portion of what was transferred, by a third party who had no claim of justice on any holding of the others before the transfer? To cut off objections irrelevant here, we might imagine the exchanges occurring in a socialist society after hours. After playing whatever basketball he does in his daily work, or doing whatever other daily work he does, Wilt Chamberlain decides to put in overtime to earn additional money. (First his work quota is set; he works time over that.) Or imagine it is a skilled juggler people like to see, who puts on shows after hours. Why might someone work overtime in a society in which it is assumed their needs are satisfied? Perhaps because they care about things other than needs. I like to write in books that I read, and to have easy access to books for browsing at odd hours. It would be very pleasant and convenient to have the resources of Widener Library in my back yard. No society, I assume, will provide such resources close to each person who would like them as part of his regular allotment (under DO. Thus, persons either must do without some extra things that they want, or be allowed to do something extra to get some of these things. On what basis could the inequalities that would eventuate be forbidden? Notice also that small factories would spring up in a socialist society, unless forbidden. I melt down some of my personal possessions (under D,) and build a machine out of the material. I offer you, and others, a philosophy lecture once a week in exchange for your cranking the handle on my machine, whose products I exchange for yet other things, and so on. (The raw materials used by the machine are given to me by others who possess them under D 1, in exchange for hearing lectures.) Each person night participate to gain things over and above their allotment under D,. Some persons even might want to leave their job in socialist industry and work full time in this private sector. I shall say something more about these issues in the next chapter. Here I wish merely to note how private property even in means of production would occur in a socialist society that did not forbid people to use as they wished some of the resources they are given under the socialist distribution D 1. The socialist society would have to forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults. The general point illustrated by the Wilt Chamberlain example and the example of the entrepreneur in a socialist society is that no end-state principle of distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous interference with people’s lives. Any favored pattern would be transformed into one unfavored by the principle, by people choosing to act in various ways; for example, by people exchanging goods and services with other people, or giving things to other people, things the transferrers are entitled to under the favored distributional pattern. To maintain a pattern one must either continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as they wish to, or continually (or periodically) interfere to take from some persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them. (But if some time limit is to be set on how long people may keep resources others voluntarily transfer to them, why let them keep these resources for any period of time? Why not have immediate confiscation?) It might be objected that all persons voluntarily will choose to refrain from actions which would upset the pattern. This presupposes unrealistically (1) that all will most want to maintain the pattern (are those who don’t, to be “reeducated” or forced to undergo self-criticism”?), (2) that each can gather enough information about his own actions and the ongoing activities of others to discover which of his actions will upset the pattern, and (3) that diverse and far-flung persons can coordinate their actions to dovetail into the pattern. Compare the manner in which the market is neutral among persons’ desires, as it reflects and transmits widely scattered information via prices, and coordinates persons’ activities. It puts things perhaps a bit too strongly to say that every patterned (or end-state) principle is liable to be thwarted by the voluntary actions of the individual parties transferring some of their shares they receive under the principle. For perhaps some very weak patterns are not so thwarted. Any distributional pattern with any egalitarian component is overturnable by the voluntary actions of individual persons over time; as is every patterned condition with sufficient content so as actually to have been proposed as presenting the central core of distributive justice. Still, given the possibility that some weak conditions or patterns may not be unstable in this way, it would be better to formulate an explicit description of the kind of interesting and contentful patterns under discussion, and to prove a theorem about their instability. Since the weaker the patterning, the more likely it is that the entitlement system itself satisfies it, a plausible conjecture is that any patterning either is unstable or is satisfied by the entitlement s y s t e m. . . . Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. Some persons find this claim obviously true: taking the earnings of n hours labor is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work n hours for another’s purpose. Others find the claim absurd. But even these, if they object to forced labor, would oppose forcing unemployed hippies to work for the benefit of the needy. And they would also object to forcing each person to work five extra hours each week for the benefit of the needy. But a system that takes five hours’ wages in taxes does not seem to them like one that forces someone to work five hours, since it offers the person forced a wider range of choice in activities than does taxation in kind with the particular labor specified. (But we can imagine a gradation of systems of forced labor, from one that specifies a particular activity, to one that gives a choice among two activities, to … ; and so on up.) Furthermore, people envisage a system with something like a proportional tax on everything above the amount necessary for basic needs. Some think this does not force someone to work extra hours, since there is no fixed number of extra hours he is forced to work, and since he can avoid the tax entirely by earning only enough to cover his basic needs. This is a very uncharacteristic view of forcing for those who also think people are forced to do something whenever the alternatives they face are considerably worse. However, neither view is correct. The fact that others intentionally intervene, in violation of a side constraint against aggression, to threaten force to limit the alternatives, in this case to paying taxes or (presumably the worse alternative) bare subsistence, makes the taxation system one of forced labor and distinguishes it from other cases of limited choices which are not forcings. The man who chooses to work longer to gain an income more than sufficient for his basic needs prefers some extra goods or services to the leisure and activities he could perform during the possible nonworking hours; whereas the man who chooses not to work the extra time prefers the leisure activities to the extra goods or services he could acquire by working more. Given this, if it would be illegitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man’s leisure (forced labor) for the purpose of serving the needy, how can it be legitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man’s goods for that purpose? Why should we treat the man whose happiness requires certain material goods or services differently from the man whose preferences and desires make such goods unnecessary for his happiness? Why should the man who prefers seeing a movie (and who has to earn money for a ticket) be open to the required call to aid the needy, while the person who prefers looking at a sunset (and hence need earn no extra money) is not? Indeed, isn’t it surprising that redistributionists choose to ignore the man whose pleasures are so easily attainable without extra labor, while adding yet another burden to the poor unfortunate who must work for his pleasures? If anything, one would have expected the reverse. Why is the person with the nonmaterial or nonconsumption desire allowed to proceed unimpeded to his most favored feasible alternative, whereas the man whose pleasures or desires involve material things and who must work for extra money (thereby serving whomever considers his activities valuable enough to pay him) is constrained in what he can realize? … Locke’s Theory of Acquisition Before we turn to consider other theories of justice in detail, we must introduce an additional bit of complexity into the structure of the entitlement theory. This is best approached by considering Locke’s attempt to specify a principle of justice in acquisition. Locke views property rights in an unowned object as originating through someone’s mixing his labor with it. This gives rise to many questions. What are the boundaries of what labor is mixed with? If a private astronaut clears a place on Mars, has he mixed his labor with (so that he comes to own) the whole planet, the whole uninhabited universe, or just a particular plot? Which plot does an act bring under ownership? The minimal (possibly disconnected) area such that an act decreases entropy in that area, and not elsewhere? Can virgin land (for the purposes of ecological investigation by high-flying airplane) come under ownership by a Lockean process? Building a fence around a territory presumably would make one the owner of only the fence (and the land immediately underneath it). Why does mixing one’s labor with something make one the owner of it? Perhaps because one owns one’s labor, and so one comes to own a previously unowned thing that becomes permeated with what one owns. Ownership seeps over into the rest. But why isn’t mixing what I own with what I don’t own a way of losing what I ow n rather than a way of gaining what I don’t? If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice? Perhaps the idea, instead, is that laboring on something improves it and makes it more valuable; and anyone is entitled to own a thing whose value he has created. (Reinforcing this, perhaps, is the view that laboring is unpleasant. If some people made things effortlessly, as the cartoon characters in The Yellow Submarine trail flowers in their wake, would they have lesser claim to their own products whose making didn’t cost them anything?) Ignore the fact that laboring on something may make it less valuable (spraying pink enamel paint on a piece of driftwood that you have found). Why should one’s entitlement extend to the whole object rather than just to the added value one’s labor has produced? (Such reference to value might also serve to delimit the extent of ownership; for example, substitute “increases the value of” for “decreases entropy in” in the above entropy criterion.) No workable or coherent value-added property scheme has yet been devised, and any such scheme presumably would fall to objections (similar to those) that fell the theory of Henry George. It will be implausible to view improving an object as giving full ownership to it, if the stock of unowned objects that might be improved is limited. For an object’s coming under one person’s ownership changes the situation of all others. new idea must convince to try it out; private property enables people to decide on the pattern and types of risks they wish to bear, leading to specialized types of risk bearing; private property protects future persons by leading some to hold back resources from current consumption for future markets; it provides alternate sources of employment for unpopular persons who don’t have to convince any one person or small group to hire them, and so on. These considerations enter a Lockean theory to support the claim that appropriation of private property satisfies the intent behind the “enough and as good left over” proviso, not as a utilitarian justification of property. They enter to rebut the claim that because the proviso is violated no natural right to private property can arise by a Lockean process. The difficulty in working such an argument to show that the proviso is satisfied is in fixing the appropriate base line for comparison. Lockean appropriation makes people no worse off than they would be how? This question of fixing the baseline needs more detailed investigation than we are able to give it here. It would be desirable to have an estimate of the general economic importance of original appropriation in order to see how much leeway there is for differing theories of appropriation and of the location of the baseline. Perhaps this importance can be measured by the percentage of all income that is based upon untransformed raw materials and given resources (rather than upon human actions), mainly rental income representing the unimproved value of land, and the price of raw material in situ, and by the percentage of current wealth which represents such income in the past. We should note that it is not only persons favoring private property who need a theory of how property rights legitimately originate. Those believing in collective property, for example those believing that a group of persons living in an area jointly own the territory, or its mineral resources, also must provide a theory of how such property rights arise; they must show why the persons living there have rights to determine what is done with the land and resources there that persons living elsewhere don’t have (with regard to the same land and resources). The Proviso Whether or not Locke’s particular theory of appropriation can be spelled out so as to handle various difficulties, I assume that any adequate theory of justice in acquisition will contain a proviso similar to the weaker of the ones we have attributed to Locke. A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened. It is important to specify this particular mode of worsening the situation of others, for the proviso does not encompass other modes. It does not include the worsening due to more limited opportunities to appropriate (the first way above, corresponding to the more stringent condition), and it does not include how I “worsen” a seller’s position if I appropriate materials to make some of what he is selling, and then enter into competition with him. Someone whose appropriation otherwise would violate the proviso still may appropriate provided he compensates the others so that their situation is not thereby worsened; unless he does compensate these others, his appropriation will violate the proviso of the principle of justice in acquisition and will be an illegitimate one. A theory of appropriation incorporating this Lockean proviso will handle correctly the cases (objections to the theory lacking the proviso) where someone appropriates the total supply of something necessary for life. A theory which includes this proviso in its principle of justice in acquisition must also contain a more complex principle of justice in transfer. Some reflection of the proviso about appropriation constrains later actions. If my appropriating all of a certain substance violates the Lockean proviso, then so does my appropriating some and purchasing all the rest from others who obtained it without otherwise violating the Lockean proviso. If the proviso excludes someone’s appropriating all the drinkable water in the world, it also excludes his purchasing it all. (More weakly, and messily, it may exclude his charging certain prices for some of his supply.) This proviso (almost?) never will come into effect; the more someone acquires of a scarce substance which others want, the higher the price of the rest will go, and the more difficult it will become for him to acquire it all. But still, we can imagine, at least, that something like this occurs: someone makes simultaneous secret bids to the separate owners of a substance, each of whom sells assuming he can easily purchase more from the other owners; or some natural catastrophe destroys all of the supply of something except that in one person’s possession. The total supply could not be permissibly appropriated by one person at the beginning. His later acquisition of it all does not show that the original appropriation violated the proviso (even by a reverse argument similar to the one above that tried to zip back from Zto A). Rather, it is the combination of the original appropriation plus all the later transfers and actions that violates the Lockean proviso. Each owner’s title to his holding includes the historical shadow of the Lockean proviso on appropriation. This excludes his transferring it into an agglomeration that does violate the Lockean proviso and excludes his using it in a way, in coordination with others or independently of them, so as to violate the proviso by making the situation of others worse than their baseline situation. Once it is known that someone’s ownership runs afoul of the Lockean proviso, there are stringent limits on what he may do with (what it is dif fi cu l t any longer unreservedly to call) “his property.” Thus a person may not appropriate the only water hole in a desert and charge what he will. Nor may he charge what he will if he possesses one, and unfortunately it happens that all the water holes in the desert dry up, except for his. This unfortunate circumstance, admittedly no fault of his, brings into operation the Lockean proviso and limits his property rights. Similarly, an owner’s property right in the only island in an area does not allow him to order a castaway from a shipwreck off his island as a trespasser, for this would violate the Lockean proviso… The fact that someone owns the total supply of something necessary for others to stay alive does not entail that his (or anyone’s) appropriation of anything left some people (immediately or later) in a situation worse than the baseline one. A medical researcher who synthesizes a new substance that effectively treats a certain disease and who refuses to sell except on his terms does not worsen the situation of others by depriving them of whatever he has appropriated. The others easily can possess the same materials he appropriated; the researcher’s appropriation or purchase of chemicals didn’t make those chemicals scarce in a way so as to violate the Lockean proviso. Nor would someone else’s purchasing the total supply of the synthesized substance from the medical researcher. The fact that the medical researcher uses easily available chemicals to synthesize the drug no more violates the Lockean proviso than does the fact that the only surgeon able to perform a particular operation eats easily obtainable food in order to stay alive and to have the energy to work. This shows that the Lockean proviso is not an “endstate principle”; it focuses on a particular way that appropriative actions affect others, and not on the structure of the situation that results. Intermediate between someone who takes all of the public supply and someone who makes the total supply out of easily obtainable substances is someone who appropriates the total supply of something in a way that does not deprive the others of it. For example, someone finds a new substance in an out-of-the-way place. He discovers that it effectively treats a certain disease and appropriates the total supply. He does not worsen the situation of others; if he did not stumble upon the substance no one else would have, and the others would remain without it. However, as time passes, the likelihood increases that others would have come across the substance; upon this fact might be based a limit to his property right in the substance so that others are not below their baseline position; for example, its bequest might be limited. The theme of someone worsening another’s situation by depriving him of something he otherwise would possess may also illuminate the example of patents. An inventor’s patent does not deprive others of an object which would not exist if not for the inventor. Yet patents would have this effect on others who independently invent the object. Therefore, these independent inventors, upon whom the burden of proving independent discovery may rest, should not be excluded from utilizing their own invention as they wish (including selling it to others). Furthermore, a known inventor drastically lessens the chances of actual independent invention. For persons who know of an invention usually will not try to reinvent it, and the notion of independent discovery here would be murky at best. Yet we may assume that in the absence of the original invention, sometime later someone else would have come up with it. This suggests placing a time limit on patents, as a rough rule of thumb to approximate how long it would have taken, in the absence of knowledge of the invention, for independent discovery. I believe that the free operation of a market system will not actually run afoul of the Lockean proviso.
I will provide 4 question and a source for each question. You could only use what I provide. You could quote from the source but the question have to be answered in your own words . Write as though yo
82 CHAPTER 6 T he Social Contract Theory Wherever law ends, tyranny begins!.!.!. J”#$ L”%&’, T HE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690) 6.1. Hobbes’s Argument Suppose we take away all the traditional props for morality. Assume, first, that there is no God to issue comman ds and reward virtue. Next, suppose that there are no natural pu rpose objects in nature have no inherent functions or int ended uses. Finally, assume that human beings are naturally sel fish. Where, then, could morality come from? If we cannot appeal to God, natu- ral purpose, or altruism, is there anything left to base morality on? Thomas Hobbes, the leading British philosopher of t he 17th century, tried to show that morality does not depend on any of those things. Instead, morality should be un derstood as the solution to a practical problem that arises for self-interested human beings. We all want to live as well as possib le; but in order to flourish, we need a peaceful, cooperative social order. And we cannot have one without rules. Those rules are the moral rules; morality consists of the precepts we need to follow in order to get the benefits of social living. That not God, in herent pur- poses, or altruism is the key to understanding ethi cs. Hobbes begins by asking what it would be like if there were no way to enforce social rules. Suppose there were no gov- ernment institutions no laws, no police, and no courts. In this situation, each of us would be free to do as we pleased. Hobbes called this the state of nature What would it be like? Hobbes thought it would be dreadful. In the state of nature, he says, there would be no place for industry, because the f ruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture o f THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 83 the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building ; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and dang er of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. The state of nature would be awful, Hobbes thought, due to four basic facts about human life: There is equality of need. Each of us needs the same basic things in order to survive food, clothing, shelter, and so on. Although we may differ in some of our needs (diabetics need insulin, others don*t), we are all essen- tially alike. There is scarcity. We do not live in the Garden of Eden, where milk flows in streams and every tree hangs heavy with fruit. The world is a hard, inhospitable place, where the things we need do not come in abundance. We have to work hard to produce them, and even then they may be in short supply. There is the essential equality of human power . Who will get the scarce goods? No one can simply take what she wants. Even though some people are smarter and tougher than others, even the strongest can be brought down when those who are less strong act together. Finally, there is limited altruism. If we cannot prevail by our own strength, what hope do we have? Can we rely on the goodwill of others? We cannot. Even if people are not wholly selfish, they care most about themselves, and we cannot assume that they will step aside when their interests conflict with ours. Together, these facts paint a grim picture. We all need the same basic things, and there aren*t enough of them to go around. Therefore, we will have to compete for them. But no one can prevail in this competition, and no one or almost no one will look after the needs of his neighbors. The result, as Hobbes puts it, is a constant state of war, of one with all And it is a war no one can win. Whoever wants to survive will try to seize what he needs and prepare to defend it from attack. 84 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY Meanwhile, others will be doing the same thing. Life in the state of nature would be intolerable. Hobbes did not think this was mere speculation. He pointed out that this is what actually happens when govern- ments collapse during civil uprisings. People hoard food, arm themselves, and lock out their neighbors. Moreover, nations themselves behave like this when international law is weak. Without a strong, overarching authority to maintain the peace, countries guard their borders, build up their armies, and feed their own people first. To escape the state of nature, we must find a way to work together. In a stable and cooperative society, we can produce more essential goods and distribute them in a rational way. But establishing such a society is not easy. People must agree on rules to govern their interactions. They must agree, for exam- ple, not to harm one another and not to break their promises. Hobbes calls such an agreement the social contract As a soci- ety, we follow certain rules, and we have ways to enforce them. Some of those ways involve the law if you assault someone, the police may arrest you. Other ways involve the court of pub- lic opinio if you get a reputation for lying, then people may turn their backs on you. All of these rules, taken together, form the social contract. It is only within the context of the social contract that we can become beneficent beings, because the contract creates the conditions under which we can afford to care about oth- ers. In the state of nature, it is every man for himself; it would be foolish for anyone to look out for others and put his own interests in jeopardy. But in society, altruism becomes possible. By releasing us from the continual fear of violent death the social contract frees us to take heed of others. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (171 1778) went so far as to say that we become different kinds of creatures when we enter civilized relations with others. In The Social Contract (1762), he writes: The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man.  .! .! .! Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physi- cal impulses  .! .! .! does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations.! .! .! .! His faculties are so stimulated and THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 85 developed,!.!.!.!his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted, that, did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually the happy moment which took him from it forever, and, instead of a stupid and unimagi-native animal, made him an intelligent being and a man. And what does the voice of dut require this new man to do? It requires him to set aside his self-centered designs in favor of rules that benefit everyone. But he is able to do this only because others have agreed to do the same thing that is the essence of the contract The Social Contract Theory explains the purpose of both morality and government. The purpose of morality is to make social living possible; the purpose of government is to enforce vital moral rules. We can summarize the social contract concep- tion of morality as follows: Morality consists in the set of rules, gov- erning behavior, that rational people will accept, on the condition that others accept them as well. And rational people will accept a rule only if they can expect to gain from it. Thus, morality is about mutual benefit; you and I are morally bound to follow a rule only if we would be better off living in a society in which that rule were usually followed. 6.2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Hobbes*s argument is one way of arriving at the Social Con- tract Theory. Another argument makes use of the Prisoner*s Dilemma a problem invented by Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher around 1950. Here*s how the problem goes. Suppose you live in a totalitarian society, and one day, to your astonishment, you are arrested and charged with treason. The police say that you have been plotting against the govern- ment with a man named Smith, who has also been arrested and is being held in a separate cell. The interrogator demands that you confess. You protest your innocence; you don*t even know Smith. But this does you no good. It soon becomes clear that your captors are not interested in the truth; they merely want to convict someone. They offer you the following deal: If Smith does not confess, but you confess and testify against him, then they will release you. You will go free, while Smith will be put away for 10 years. 86 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY If Smith confesses and you do not, the situation will be reversed he will go free while you get 10 years. If you both confess, you will each be sentenced to 5 years. If neither of you confesses, then there won*t be enough evidence to convict either of you. They can hold you for a year, but then they will have to let both of you go. Finally, you are told that Smith is being offered the same deal; but you cannot communicate with him, and you have no way of knowing what he will do. The problem is this: Assuming that your only goal is to spend as little time in jail as possible, what should you do? Confess or not confess? For the purposes of this problem, you should forget about maintaining your dignity and standing up for your rights. That is not what this problem is about. You should also forget about trying to help Smith. This problem is strictly about calculating what is in your own best interests. What will get you free the quickest? At first glance, it may seem that the question cann ot be answered unless you know what Smith will do. But th at is an illusion. The problem has a perfectly clear solutio n: No mat- ter what Smith does, you should confess. This can b e shown as follows: (1) Either Smith will confess or he won*t. (2) Suppose Smith confesses. Then, if you confess you will get 5 years, whereas if you do not confess you will get 10 years. Therefore, if he confesses, you are better off confessing. (3) On the other hand, suppose Smith does not confess. Then, if you confess you will go free, whereas if you do not confess you get one year. Therefore, if Smith does not confess, you will still be better off confessing. (4) Therefore, you should confess. That will get you out of jail the soonest, no matter what Smith does. So far, so good. But remember that Smith is being offered the same deal. Thus, he will also confess. The result will be that you both get 5-year sentences. But if you had both done the oppo- site, you both could have gotten out in only one year . It*s a curious situation: Because you and Smith both act selfishly, you both wind up worse off. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 87 Now suppose you can communicate with Smith. In that case, you could make a deal with him. You could agree that neither of you will confess; then you will both get the 1-year detention. By cooperating, you will both be better off than if you act independently. Cooperating will not get either of you the optimum result immediate freedom but it will get both of you a better result than you would have gotten alone. It is vital, however, that any agreement between you and Smith be enforceable, because if he reneges and confesses while you keep the bargain, you will end up serving the maxi- mum 10 years while he goes free. Thus, in order for you to rationally participate in such a deal, you need to be sure that Smith will keep up his end. Morality as the Solution to Prisoner’s-Dilemma-Type Problems. The Prisoner*s Dilemma is not just a clever puzzle. Although the story it tells is fictitious, the pattern it exemplifies comes up often in real life. Consider, for example, the choice between two general strategies of living. You could pursue your own interests exclusively in every situation, you could do whatever will benefit yourself, taking no notice of anyone else. Let us call this acting selfishly Alternatively, you could care about others, balancing their interests against your own, and some- times forgoing your own interests for their sake. Let us call this strategy acting benevolently.” But it is not only you who has to decide how to live. Other people also have to choose which strategy to adopt. There are four possibilities: (a) You could be selfish while other people are benevolent; (b) others could be selfish while you are benev- olent; (c) everyone could be selfish; and (d) everyone could be benevolent. How would you fare in each of these situations? Purely from the standpoint of your own welfare, you might assess the possibilities like this: You would be best off if you were selfish while other peo- ple were benevolent. You would get the benefit of their generosity without having to return the favor. (In this situation, you would be a free rider ) Second-best would be if everyone were benevolent. You would no longer have the advantages that come from ignoring other people*s interests, but you would be 88 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHYtreated well by others. (This is the situation of ordinary morality ) A bad situation, but not the worst, would be one in which everyone was selfish. You would try to protect your own interests, but you would get little help from others. (This is Hobbes*s state of nature ) You would be worst off if you were benevolent while oth-ers were selfish. Other people could stab you in the back whenever they saw fit, but you would never do the same. You would come out on the short end every time. (This is the sucker*s payoff ) This situation has the same structure as the Prison er*s Dilemma. In fact, it is a Prisoner*s Dilemma, even though it involves no prisoners. Again, we can prove that you should adopt the selfish strategy: (1) Either other people will respect your interests or they won*t. (2) If they do respect your interests, you will be better off not respecting theirs, at least whenever that would be to your advantage. This will be the optimum situation—you get to be a free rider. (3) If they do not respect your interests, then it will be fool- ish for you to respect theirs. That will land you i n the worst possible situation you get the sucker*s payof f. (4) Therefore, regardless of what other people do, you are better off adopting the policy of looking out for yourself. You should be selfish. And now we come to the catch: Other people, of course, can reason in the same way, and the result will be that we end up in Hobbes*s state of nature. Everyone will be selfish, willing to knife anyone who gets in their way. In that situation, each of us would be worse off than if we all cooperated. To escape the dilemma, we need another enforceable agree- ment, this time to obey the rules of mutually respe ctful social liv- ing. As before, cooperation will not yield the opti mum outcome for each individual, but it will lead to a better r esult than non- cooperation. We need, in David Gauthier*s words, to bargain our way into morality We can do that by establish ing laws and social customs that protect the interests of everyo ne involved. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 89 6.3. Some Advantages of the Social Contract Theory Morality, on this theory, consists in the rules that rational peo- ple will accept, on the condition that others accept them as well. The strength of this theory is due, in large part, to the fact that it provides plausible answers to some difficult questions. 1. What moral rules are we bound to follow, and how ar e those rules justified? The morally binding rules are the ones that facilitate harmonious social living. We could not l ive together in peace if we allowed murder, assault, theft, lyin g, prom- ise breaking, and so on. The rules forbidding those acts are therefore justified by their tendency to promote ha rmony and cooperation. On the other hand, moral rule that condemn prostitution, sodomy, and sexual promiscuity cannot be justi- fied on these grounds. How is social living hampere d by pri- vate, voluntary sexual activity? How would it benef it us to agree to such rules? What people do behind closed doors i s outside the scope of the social contract. Such rules, there fore, have no claim on us. 2. Why is it rational for us to follow the moral rules? We agree to follow the moral rules because we benefit from living in a place where the rules are accepted. However, we actually do follow the rules we keep our end of the bargain because the rules will be enforced, and it is rational for us to avoid punishment. Why don*t you kidnap your boss? Because you might get caught. But what if you think you won*t get caught? Why follow the rules then? To answer this question, first note that you don*t want other people to break the rules when they think they can avoid punishment you don*t want other people to com- mit murder, assault, and so on, just because they think they can get away with it. After all, they might be murdering or assault-ing you. For this reason, we want others to accept the contract in more than a frivolous or lighthearted way. We want them to form a firm intention to hold up their end of the bargain; we want them to become the sort of people who won*t be tempted to stray. And, of course, they will demand the same of us, as part of the agreement. But once we have this firm intention, it is rational to act on it. Why don*t you kidnap your boss, when you think you can get away with it? Because you*ve made a firm decision not to be that sort of person. 90 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY3. Under what circumstances is it rational to break the rules? We agree to obey the rules on the condition that others obey them as well. But when someone else breaks the rules, he releases us from our obligations toward him. For example, suppose some- one refuses to help you in circumstances in which he clearly should. If later on he needs your help, you may rightly feel that you have no duty to help him. The same point explains why punishing criminals is acceptable. Lawbreakers are treated differently from other citizens in punishing them, we treat them in ways that are normally forbidden. Why can we do this? Remember that the rules apply to you only if other people also follow them. So, you may disregard those rules when dealing with someone who doesn*t follow them. In breaking the rules, the criminal thus leaves himself open to retaliation. This explains why it is legiti-mate for the government to enforce the law. 4. How much can morality demand of us? Morality seems to require that we be impartial, that is, that we give no greater weight to our own interests than to the interests of others. But suppose you face a situation in which you must choose between your own death and the deaths of five other people. Impartial- ity, it seems, would require you to choose your own death; after all, there are five of them and only one of you. Are you morally bound to sacrifice yourself? Philosophers have often felt uneasy about this sort of example; they have felt instinctively that somehow there are limits to what morality can demand of us. Therefore, they have traditionally said that such heroic actions are supererogatory— that is, above and beyond the call of duty, admirable when they occur but not morally required. Yet it is hard to explain why such actions are not required. If morality demands impartial behavior, and it is better that one person die rather than five, then you should be required to sacrifice yourself. What does the Social Contract Theory say about this ? Suppose the question is whether to have the rule I f you can save many lives by sacrificing your own life, then you must do so Would it be rational to accept this rule, on t he condition that everyone else accepts it? Presumably, it would be. After all, each of us is more likely to benefit from this rule than to be harmed by it you*re more likely to be among t hose saved than to be the one and only person who gives up her THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 91 life. Thus, it may seem that the Social Contract Theory does require moral heroism. But this is not so. On the Social Contract Theory, moral- ity consists in the rules that rational people will accept on the condition that others accept them as well . However, it would not be rational to make an agreement that we don*t expect others to follow. Can we expect other people to follow this rule of self- sacrifice can we expect strangers to give up their lives for us? We cannot. Most people won*t be that benevolent, even if they have promised to be. Can we expect the threat of punishment to make them that benevolent? Again, we cannot; people*s fear of death is likely to overwhelm any fear they have of punishment. Thus, there is a natural limit to the amount of self-sacrifice that the social contract can require: Rational people will not agree to rules so demanding that others won*t follow them. In this way, the Social Contract Theory explains a feature of morality that other theories may remain silent on. 6.4. The Problem of Civil Disobedience Moral theories should help us understand concrete moral issues. The Social Contract Theory in particular should help us understand issues about social institutions after all, explain- ing the proper function of those institutions is one of the main goals of the theory. So let*s consider again our obligation to obey the law. Are we ever justified in breaking the law? If so, when? The great modern examples of civil disobedience are taken from the Indian independence movement led by Mohan- das K. Gandhi (186 1948) and the American civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King Jr. (192 1968). Both movements were characterized by public, conscientious, non- violent refusal to comply with the law. In 1930, Gandhi and his followers marched to the coastal village of Dandi, where they defied British law by distilling salt from saltwater. The Brit- ish had been controlling salt production so they could force the Indian peasants to buy it at high prices. In America, Dr. King led the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which began after Rosa Parks was arrested on December 1, 1955, for refusing to give up her bus seat to a white man. Parks was defying one of the Jim Cro laws designed to enforce racial segregation in the South. 92 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY Gandhi and King, the two greatest proponents of nonviolence in the 20th century, were both murdered by gunfire. Their movements had importantly different goals. Gan- dhi and his followers did not recognize the right of the Brit- ish to govern India; they wanted to replace British rule with an entirely different system. King and his followers, however, did not question the legitimacy of the American government. Rather, they objected only to particular laws and social policies that they felt were unjust so unjust, in fact, that they refused to comply with them. In his Letter from the Birmingham City Jai (1963), King describes the frustration and anger that arise when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate-filled policemen curse, kick, bru- talize and even kill your black brothers and sisters with impunity; when you see the vast majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent society; when you sud- denly find your tongue twisted and your speech stammer- ing as you seek to explain to your six-year-old daughter why she can*t go to the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television, and see tears welling up in her little eyes when she is told that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see the depressing clouds of inferi-ority begin to form in her little mental sky. The problem was not only that racial segregation, with all its attendant evils, was enforced by social custom; it was a mat- ter of law as well, law that black citizens were denied a voice in formulating. When urged to rely on ordinary democratic processes, King pointed out that all attempts to use these pro- cesses had failed. And as for democracy he said, that word had no meaning to southern blacks: Throughout the state of Alabama all types of conniving methods are used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters and there are some counties without a single Negro registered to vote despite the fact that the Negro constitutes a majority of the population King believed, therefore, that blacks had no choice but to defy the unjust laws and to accept the consequences by going to jail. Today we remember King as a great moral leader. At the time, however, his strategy of civil disobedience was highly THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 93 controversial. Many liberals expressed sympathy for his goals but didn*t agree with his tactic of breaking the law. An article in the New York State Bar Journal in 1965 expressed the typical worries. After assuring his readers that long before Dr. King was born, I espoused, and still espouse, the cause of civil rights for all people Louis Waldman, a prominent New York lawyer, argues: Those who assert rights under the Constitution and the laws made thereunder must abide by that Constitution and the law, if that Constitution is to survive. They cannot pick and choose; they cannot say they will abide by those laws which they think are just and refuse to abide by those laws which they think are unjust.!.!.!.The country, therefore, cannot accept Dr. King*s doctrine that he and his followers will pick and choose, knowing that it is illegal to do so. I say, such doctrine is not only illegal and for that reason alone should be aban- doned, but that it is also immoral, destructive of the prin- ciples of democratic government, and a danger to the very civil rights Dr. King seeks to promote. Waldman had a point: If our legal system is basically decent, then defying the law is on its face a bad thing, because open defiance of particular laws might weaken people*s respect for the law generally. To meet this objection, King sometimes said that the evils he opposed were so serious, so numerous, and so difficult to fight that civil disobedience was justified as a last resort. The end justifies the means, though the means are regrettable. This argument may be enough to answer Wald- man*s objections. But there is a more profound reply available. According to the Social Contract Theory, we are obl igated to obey the law because we each participate in a so cial system that promises more benefits than burdens. The benef its are the benefits of social living: We escape the state of n ature and live in a society in which we are secure and enjoy basic ri ghts. To gain these benefits, we agree to uphold the institutions that make them possible. This means that we must obey the law , pay our taxes, and so forth these are the burdens we accept in return. But what if some citizens are denied their basic rights? What if the police, instead of protecting them, curse, kick, brutalize and even kill [them] with impunit ? What if some groups of people are denied a decent education while they and 94 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY their families are smothering in an airtight cage of povert ? Under such circumstances, the social contract is not being hon- ored. By asking the disadvantaged group to obey the law and respect society*s institutions, we are asking them to accept the burdens of social living while being denied its benefits. This line of reasoning suggests that civil disobedience is not an undesirable last resor for socially disenfranchised groups. Rather, it is the most natural and reasonable means of expressing protest. For when the disadvantaged are denied the benefits of social living, they are released from the contract that would otherwise require them to follow society*s rules. This is the deepest argument for civil disobedience, and the Social Contract Theory presents it clearly and forcefully. 6.5. Difficulties for the Theory The Social Contract Theory is one of the major options in contemporary moral philosophy, along with Utilitarianism, Kantianism, and Virtue Ethics. It is easy to see why; the theory seems to explain a great deal about moral life. Two important objections, however, have been made against it. First, it is said that the Social Contract Theory is based on a historical fiction. We are asked to imagine that people once lived in isolation from one another, that they found this intol- erable, and that they eventually banded together, agreeing to follow social rules of mutual benefit. But none of this ever hap- pened. It is just a fantasy. So of what relevance is it? To be sure, if people had come together in this way, we could explain their obligations to one another as the theory suggests: They would be obligated to obey the rules that they had agreed to obey. But even then, there would be problems. Was the agreement unan- imous? If not, what about the people who didn*t sign up are they not required to act morally? And if the contract was made a long time ago by our ancestors, why should we be bound to it? But anyway, there never was such a contract, and so nothing can be explained by appealing to it. As one critic wisecracked, the social contract isn*t worth the paper it*s not written on To be sure, none of us ever signed a rea contract there is no piece of paper bearing our signatures. Immigrants, who promise to obey the law when they are granted citizenship, are THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 95 the exception. The contract theorist might say, however, that a social arrangement like the one described does exist, for all of us: There is a set of rules that everyone recognizes as binding on them, and we all benefit from the fact that these rules are generally followed. Each of us accepts the benefits conferred by this arrangement; and, more than that, we expect and encour- age other people to observe the rules. This is a description of the actual world; it is not fictitious. And, by accepting the bene- fits of this arrangement, we incur an obligation to do our part which at least means that we should follow the rules. We are thus bound by an implicit social contract. It is implici because we become a party to it not by explicitly making a promise, but by accepting the benefits of social living. Thus, the story of the social contrac need not b e intended as a description of historical events. Rather, it i s a useful analytical tool, based on the idea that we may understand our moral obli- gations as if they had arisen in this way. Consider the followin g situation: Suppose you come upon a group of people playing an elaborate game. It looks like fun, and you join in. After a while, however, you begin to break some of the rules, beca use that looks like more fun. When the other players protest , you say that you never promised to follow the rules. However, yo ur remark is irrelevant. Perhaps nobody promised to obey; but , by joining the game, each person implicitly agreed to abide by the rules that make the game possible. It is as though they had all agreed. Morality is like this. The gam is social living; the rules, which make the game possible, are the rules of morality. That response to the first objection, however, is ineffective. When a game is in progress, and you join in, it is obvious that you choose to join in, because you could have just walked away. For that reason, you must respect the game*s rules, or you will rightly be regarded as a nuisance. By contrast, some- body born into today*s big cooperative world does not choose to join it; nobody chooses to be born. And then, once a per- son has grown up, the costs of leaving that world are severe. How could you opt out? You might become a survivalist and never use electricity, roads, the water service, and so on. But that would be a great burden. Alternatively, you might leave the country. But what if you don*t like the social rules that exist in any of the other countries, either? Moreover, as David Hume 96 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (171 1776) observed, many people are not free to leave their countr in any meaningful sense: Can we seriously say that a poor peasant! .! .! .! has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by remaining [on a ship], freely consents to the dominion of the master, though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish the moment he leaves. Thus, life is not like joining a game, whose rules you may reject by walking away. Rather, life is like being thrust into a game you can*t walk away from. The contract theorist has not explained why one must obey the rules of such a game. Does the first objection therefore refute the Social Con- tract Theory? I don*t think so. The contract theorist may say this: Participating in a sensible social scheme is rational; it really is in one*s best interest. This is why the rules are valid because they benefit those who live under them. If someone doesn*t agree to the rules, the rules still apply to him; he*s just being irrational. Suppose, for example, that a survivalist forgoes the benefits of social living. May he then refuse to pay his taxes? He may not, because even he would be better off paying his taxes and enjoying the benefits of clean water, paved roads, indoor plumbing, and so on. The survivalist might not want to play the game, but the rules still apply to him, because it would really and truly be in his interest to join in. This defense of the Social Contract Theory abandons the idea that morality is based on an agreement. However, it holds fast to the idea that morality consists in rules of mutual benefit. It also accords with the definition of the theory we gave earlier: Morality consists in the set of rules, governing behavior, that rational people will accept, on the condition that others accept them as well. Rational people will agree to the mutually beneficial rules. The second objection is more troubling. Some individuals cannot benefit us. Thus, according to the Social Co ntract Theory, these individuals have no claim on us, and we may ignore their interests when we*re writing up the rules of society. The moral rules will therefore let us treat these individuals in any way whatsoever. This implication of the theory is unacceptable. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 97 There would be at least four vulnerable groups: Human infants Nonhuman animals Future generations Oppressed populations Suppose, for example, that a sadist wanted to torme nt a cat or a small child. He would not benefit from a system of rules forbidding the torture of infants and animals ; after all, the infant and the cat cannot benefit him, and he wants to practice his cruel behavior. Of course, the infant*s parents , and the cat*s owners, would be indirectly harmed under such a sys tem, and they might want to retaliate against the sadist. In such a situa- tion, it is hard to know what moral rules would be valid. But sup- pose the sadist found some abandoned children or so me stray cats out in the woods. Now the Social Contract Theo ry cannot condemn him even if he commits acts of the greatest cruelty. Or consider future generations. They cannot benefit us; we*ll be dead before they are even born. But we can profit at their expense. Why shouldn*t we run up the national debt? Why shouldn*t we pollute the lakes and coat the skies with carbon dioxide? Why shouldn*t we bury toxic waste in containers that will fall apart in a hundred years? It would not be against our interests to allow such actions; it would only harm our descen- dants. So, we may do so. Or consider oppressed populations. When the Europeans colonized new lands, why weren*t they morally allowed to enslave the native inhabitants? After all, the native inhabitants did not have the weapons to put up a good fight. The Europeans could benefit most by creating a society in which the native inhabitants would be their slaves. This objection does not concern some minor aspect of the theory; it goes right to the root of the tree. The Social Con- tract Theory is grounded in self-interest and reciprocity; thus, it seems unable to recognize the moral duties we have to indi-viduals who cannot benefit us.
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TRUST, HONESTY AND ETHICS IN BUSINESS Tamar Frankel De Boeck Supérieur | « Finance & Bien Commun » 2008/2 N o 31-32 | pages 87 à 93 ISSN 1422-4658 Article disponible en ligne à l’adresse : ——————————————————————————————————————– https://www.cairn.info/revue-finance-et-bien-commun-2008-2-page-87.htm ——————————————————————————————————————– Pour citer cet article : ——————————————————————————————————————– Tamar Frankel, « Trust, Honesty and Ethics in Business », Finance & Bien Commun 2008/2 (N o 31-32), p. 87-93. DOI 10.3917/fbc.031.0087 ——————————————————————————————————————– Distribution électronique Cairn.info pour De Boeck Supérieur. © De Boeck Supérieur. Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n’est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d’utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l’éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur 87 TT rust, Honesty and Ethics in Business Trust is crucial to the health of the financial system and the economy. In the past, when most trade and finance were conducted by people who knew each other, trust or mistrust developed naturally. In small communities, sanc – tions, like exclusion, could be a power – ful means of preventing abuse of trust. But today, in a global financial system, people are forced to interact with stran – gers, and trust cannot be established as it was in the past. What is the state of trust in the financial system today? When I was writing the book on Trust and Hon – esty, America’s Business Culture at a Crossroad (published in 2006), I found a significant change in peo – ple’s attitudes towards honesty and trustworthiness. There is no proof that there are more incidents of fraud today than there were in the past. America has always had its fair share of scandals and fraud. It has had its Robber Barons and medicine men who defrauded gullible people in small towns. It has had many corpo – rate and financial frauds throughout the ages. I cannot prove that there is a change in the number of frauds to – day compared with the past. What has changed, however, is the attitude towards dishonesty and breach of trust. Today, there is great – er acceptance and more justification of dishonesty. In some cases, we have legitimized what in the past would have been considered an abuse of trust. And, moreover, the potential victims are required to protect them – selves from abuse. This new and very dangerous trend leads to a culture of dishonesty and, in some respects, this cultural change is far more se – rious than an increasing number of cases of dishonesty. Culture considered as social habits I define culture as social habits: it is how people expect themselves and others to behave. We don’t give much thought to this expectation; it is not questioned or examined. In fact, people can rarely imagine any other way of doing things than the habits of the society in which they live. Culture often includes social enforcement of these expectations. If people expect others to tell the truth, then liars will be ostracized. If people are used to hiring assassins to kill their competitors, self-protec – tion, deep mistrust and killings are part of the culture. Like all habits, social habits are efficient. People need not think about how to behave, or how not to behave. They need not Tamar Frankel Boston University School of Law faculty La confiance est crucia – le pour le bien être du système financier et de l’économie. Toutefois, aujourd’hui, on accepte et on justifie plus faci – lement les comporte – ments malhonnêtes. La culture de la mal – honnêteté et de l’abus de confiance est dange – reuse. Si la malhonnê – teté est acceptée parce que « tout le monde le fait », celle-ci peut devenir une habitude sociale très difficile à modifier. L’alternative à la confiance est la véri – fication. Toutefois, la vérification et les pré – cautions peuvent avoir un coût très élevé. TRUST, HONESTY AND ETHICS IN BUSINESS no31-32-OK.indd 87 03.09.2009 07:44:31 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur FINANCE & THE COMMON GOOD/ BIEN COMMUN – N° 31-32 – II-III/2008 88 weigh the pros and cons. They can act quickly and automatically. Yet habits are far from perfect. They are hard to develop. It takes many rep – etitions before peoples’ actions and attitudes are established and become habits. Moreover, habits can be bad, or can become bad with a changing environment. Because culture is in – grained, it takes time and effort to change. Tendencies to bad habits must therefore be strongly discour – aged before they can become habits. That is why a culture of dishones – ty and abuse of trust is so dangerous. If dishonesty is accepted because ‘eve – ryone does it’, the acceptance might freeze into a social habit and would then prove very hard to eliminate. Trust and alternative verification Trust can be defined in many ways. I define it as the ‘reasonable be – lief that trusted persons: (1) tell the truth and (2) keep their promises’. An alternative to trust is verification. If people did not show trust, they would seek to verify the other per – sons’ statements, and demand guar – antees to back the others’ promises. However, verification and guarantees can be very costly. If we measure trust and verification by cost, we can determine when trust is necessary and when it is less important. For example, buying a newspaper does not require trusting the seller. The buyer can easily verify that the newspaper is the one the buyer wants. And because the exchange of price for newspaper is simultaneous, there is no need for guarantees. Besides, the amount involved is not very large. In this case the buyer can protect his interests. But if I hand over my life’s savings to a money-manager, I have no choice but to trust the manager. It is nearly impossible for me to verify what the manager will do with my money without negating the very usefulness of his service. In addition, entrusting the money and receiving the service are not simultaneous. I entrust my money to the manager first; only then can the manager per – form his service for me. Therefore, I am at risk that the manager might be tempted to avoid telling the truth or abiding by his promises. In addition, the amount of money involved here could be large and the risk of losing it may affect my future. In this case I must trust the manager and I may demand guaran – tees or regulation to reduce my risk of loss. If I cannot trust him, I had better not entrust my savings to him. Trust in this case must be supported by other mechanisms that protect from dishonesty. Morality as a barrier to abuse of trust As I have already mentioned, there is a greater acceptance of dis – honesty today. The danger is that this attitude could become part of the American or even universal culture. Abuse of trust, and the mistrust that follows, can undermine commercial and financial interaction, and drasti – cally change our way of life. Trust can La confiance est soutenue par plusieurs mécanismes, parmi les – quels il y a la moralité, les lois et le marché. Le comportement moral est valorisé parce que sa mise en application est la moins coûteuse pour la société. De plus, des tendances psychologiques telles que la honte, l’empa – thie et la culpabilité, retiennent la plupart des gens de faire du mal aux autres. Tou – tefois, une culture qui dénigre et ridiculise ces tendances peut affaiblir leur effet dissuasif. Alors que la loi peut faire obstacle à la malhonnêteté, son influence s’est affaiblie ces trente dernières années. no31-32-OK.indd 88 03.09.2009 07:44:32 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur 89 Selon une conviction répandue parmi les membres du Congrès américain, moins il y a de lois, plus est grande la liberté du secteur privé et du manage – ment financier, et donc mieux l’Amérique se porte. Dans les trente derniè – res années, la moralité et les lois ont reculé devant à la régulation du marché par lui- même. L’idée de régulation du marché part du prin – cipe que l’information et l’éducation sur les questions financières et sur le système financier permettent aux inves – tisseurs de prendre librement les bonnes décisions. be supported by many mechanisms. Here I shall focus on just three: mo – rality, law and the market. The first of them, morality, is vol – untary. Moral behaviour is self-regu – lating rather than enforced – when good behaviour is imposed by the threat of punishment, the behaviour is no longer moral. We value moral behaviour because its enforcement is the least costly to society. Moral people will do the right thing even if there are no police around. Po – lice are an expense to society; they can also cause problems of abuse of power. So self-enforcement of social rules is a better option. Morality can be taught. Usually, it must be taught at an early age, at home and in school. Some studies show that morality is part of our genetic make-up, together with our drive to survive. There are psychological ten – dencies, such as shame, empathy and guilt that induce most people to avoid harming others. However, while most people have those feelings, culture can strengthen or weaken them. A culture that denigrates and ridicules shame, empathy and guilt, can weaken them. So can a culture that emphasizes op – posite drives, such as rational self-in – terest as the best guide to human be – haviour, benefiting both individuals and society. Adam Smith recognized moral – ity, caring for others, and love. But this part of his teachings has been distilled and his name is forever as – sociated with a different approach to economics and understanding of markets. Thus, morality and the feel – ings that restrict antisocial behaviour – the most effective and least expen – sive form of trust enforcement – have been weakened. The law can serve as a barrier to dishonesty but, in the past thirty years, respect for the law has eroded. Some courts have interpreted law narrowly and literally, avoiding any consideration of policy, which is what they used to do in the past. That left room for self-interest without a balance of societal interest. In addi – tion, Congress has been populated by members who believe that the less legislation, the greater the freedom of private sector corporate and financial management, the better off America would be. The law supports trust A few years ago, Congress im – posed constraints on corporate pow – er and gatekeepers, by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This Act was passed in reaction to massive frauds in large corporations. However, when the shocked reaction to these frauds subsided, business leaders, lawyers, and academics sharply criticized the Act as imposing unnecessary costs on business. That may to some ex – tent be true, but this ferocious and concentrated attack suggests that the pressures to curtail the field of appli – cation of law that began in the mid- 1970s are still at work. In the past thirty years, morality and law have lost ground to market regulation. The idea of market regu – lation was that people should be of – fered information and should be edu – TRUST, HONESTY AND ETHICS IN BUSINESS no31-32-OK.indd 89 03.09.2009 07:44:32 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur FINANCE & THE COMMON GOOD/ BIEN COMMUN – N° 31-32 – II-III/2008 90 cated about financial matters and the financial system. As a consequence, they should be free to choose advis – ers. They should be free to decide what investments are good for them. Government should not determine that an investment is too risky for anyone. No court should decide that an offer of risky securities is fraudu – lent, so long as true information was provided publicly. No one, includ – ing individuals and corporations, should be restrained from borrowing as much as they wished, provided they find someone prepared to lend to them. The third mechanism: the market The regulators followed the same trend. They took a permissive atti – tude to financial innovation, freeing it from legal constraints but not follow – ing up to discover how the freedom was used. Regulators believed that market signals were better than gov – ernment planning for the economy. The aggregate judgment of millions of investors, even if many of them were not experts, was more accurate than the judgment of a few experts. However, in practice, the theory did not work precisely as was hoped. Providing information to investors may not prove enough, especially when the information is complex, and mistakes can be disastrous. In – vestors’ self-education is not opti – mal when it is time-consuming, and when financial intermediaries send out signals of trustworthiness. More – over, the requirement of self-pro – tection signals the opposite of trust: ‘Don’t rely on others’. Market regulation is supported by mechanisms designed to main – tain trust. Most important are the lawyers, accountants, advisers, fi – nancial planners, analysts, rating agencies, and appraisers. During the past thirty years, these gatekeepers have failed to ensure trustworthiness and honesty in the markets. One reason for their failure is that these gatekeepers turned their main focus from gate-keeping to profit-making – they have become businessmen. This conversion of gate-keeping professionals to businesses in pursuit of monetary profits as their main mis – sion undermined a crucial element required in maintaining market regu – lation in support of trust. Gatekeep – ers should view their main mission as preventing illegal actions. Instead they focused on profit-making. In 1979, the Supreme Court of the Untied States overruled the long-term practice of the legal profession that prohibited lawyers from advertising and required them to charge fixed fees for various services. After 1979, lawyers could compete for business and charge different fees. The pre – sumption was that in a free market, lawyers would compete to provide potential clients with more informa – tion and charge reduced fees. The results were disappointing. Legal fees went up, not down. Law – yers became far more like business – men, and competition did not result in higher quality services. In fact, it Tout le monde devrait pouvoir emprunter autant qu’il le souhaite, s’il trouve quelqu’un qui veuille bien lui prêter l’argent. Les régulateurs ont suivi la tendance. Ils ont adopté une attitude permissive envers les innovations financiè – res, en les dégageant des contraintes légales sans toutefois contrôler comment cette liberté était utilisée. Dans la pratique, la théorie n’a pas marché précisément comme espéré. Il peut ne pas être suffisant d’offrir des informations aux investisseurs, notam – ment quand l’informa – tion est complexe et les erreurs potentiellement désastreuses. La régulation financiè – re est soutenue par des mécanismes destinés à maintenir la confiance. Mais, pendant les tren – te dernières années, ces régulateurs n’ont pas réussi à assurer la con – fiance et l’honnêteté sur les marchés. no31-32-OK.indd 90 03.09.2009 07:44:32 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur 91 lowered the quality. Gate-keeping was subverted. Some lawyers provid – ed clients with innovative loopholes in the law, all at a price. Market fo – cus on ‘let the other party protect it – self from me’ took hold. Thus, the trend of the last thirty years has been to strengthen the markets, and consequently, require trusting people to protect themselves against abusers of trust. The trend has been to reduce the pressure on trusted persons to self-regulation or to obey the laws that restrict and prohibit the abuse of trust. These conditions led to the flight of trusting people from the financial markets and had a dev – astating effect on the economy. Can a market regulate dishonesty? The belief that any market can regulate dishonesty and that market regulation should trump government regulation is based on an assumption that the market can ‘correct’ prob – lems of dishonesty as they arise. Af – ter all, it took a few months for the shares of Enron Corporation to fall from approximately $78 to about 19 cents. There are always some trend- setters, who lead the correction. It may well be that regulators react faster than the market, and prevent some of the losses that market cor – rections might cause. However, even if this is the case, government regulation has flaws. Regulators do not know the unin – tended consequences of their actions; regulation may inhibit innovation; and, therefore, in the long-run regu – lation may create greater problems. Yet the cost of market solutions and resolution of problems can be very high. In the case of the Enron Corporation, the losses to Enron’s shareholders – individuals and insti – tutional investors, such as pension plans – were enormous. Today, there is indeed ‘market correction’ of ex – cessive borrowing and risk taking. There is market correction of inno – vations that were not well tested and those that led to deceit and abuse of trust. However, the price of such cor – rections to the country is proving to be devastating. The issue, here, is not whether markets can regulate behaviour. The issue is the price that the financial sys – tem and the economy pay for market regulation. In fact, today the markets are correcting the excesses of the past twenty-five or thirty years. Lending and borrowing have stopped altogeth – er. Excess leverage has reached melting down point. Speculation has been re – placed by a frantic search for security, liquidity, and lower risks. Yet, before these ‘corrections’ took place, the mar – ket allowed financial intermediaries to provide enormous leverage, and take incredibly high risks, only to result in similarly drastic ‘corrective measures’. Therefore, the issue is not whether markets ‘correct’ behaviour that un – dermines trust, but whether market corrections are at times too costly and whether less initial freedom might lead to lower correction costs. Of course market regulation has a place. But its place has been expanded and the right En effet, ils ont délaissé la surveillance des marchés pour se tour – ner vers le profit. La tendance a été de réduire la pres – sion exercée sur les opérateurs pour les laisser s’autoréguler, et en même temps de demander de se pro – téger elles-mêmes aux victimes potentielles d’abus. La conviction que le marché peut contrôler la malhonnêteté et que l’autorégulation doit se substituer à l’action des gouvernements est basée sur le postulat de l’aptitude du marché à « remédier » à ses propres problèmes. La question n’est pas de savoir si le mar – ché est en mesure de « remédier » aux abus, mais si ces remèdes ne sont pas trop coûteux et s’il ne vaut pas mieux poser certaines limites dès le départ. TRUST, HONESTY AND ETHICS IN BUSINESS no31-32-OK.indd 91 03.09.2009 07:44:32 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur FINANCE & THE COMMON GOOD/ BIEN COMMUN – N° 31-32 – II-III/2008 92 balance between market, morality and law has been lost. What is the best balance of morality, law and market regulation? The balance is not clear. There are disagreements on whether markets and competition enhance or undermine morality. An inevitable reduction in trust Morality – self-restraint – conflicts with market competition – the drive to get ahead of others. Yet, while mar – kets and morality can weaken each other, they need not undermine each other. With cutthroat competition markets would not survive. Total self-restraint may also be destructive to markets. Long-term competition involves self-restraint. A similar bal – ance can be sought in the law. What is clear is that the degree of expanding market regulation has not been justified. Market regulation shifts the burden of maintaining trust from ‘trusted persons’ to ‘trusting persons’. Market regulation requires trusting persons to protect them – selves against fraud of the people to whom they entrust their money. The result is an inevitable reduc – tion in trust by these vulnerable per – sons. And when their self-protection is weak, and morality of trusted peo – ple weakens as well, the shift to mar – ket regulation is likely to be accom – panied by an abuse of trust. Freedom from supervision of trusted people poses great temptations. When this freedom and rejection of legal con – straints are accompanied by theo – retical justifications, abuse of trust is likely. This abuse may become cultural. It is then no longer called abuse. The behaviour is accepted and justified because ‘everyone does it’. What used to be considered as abuse can be legitimized by deni – grating the law, and even explicitly amending it. Consequences of mistrust Trusting people do not cease to trust on the first doubt or signal of abuse. But at some point abuse and un – expected large losses will cause a break – down in trust. People who were unable to protect themselves from abuse learn their lesson. Those who could protect themselves, but did not, also learned their lesson. And people who have learned self-protection will tend to mistrust. In the end, all flee the market. It is then that those who rely on being trusted are left without clients, and the financial markets that are founded on trust crash and are decimated. To be sure, markets continue to ex – ist. However, they exist among parties who can protect themselves from the abuse of others or who have good rea – sons to trust. Deals are made by people who have known each other, usually depend on each other, and therefore can enforce the trust in each other. The markets that disappear are the markets in which trust is necessary because self-protection is too costly and per – sonal knowledge of the other parties is almost impossible. These markets no longer function. The trusting people flee from them. This is the situation we have reached today. La régulation du marché par lui-même présuppose que les personnes qui confient leur argent à des professionnels se pré – munissent contre des fraudes possibles de la part de ces derniers. Cela conduit à une inévitable baisse de confiance. Ceux qui font appel à la confiance sont délaissés par leurs clients et les marchés financiers eux-mêmes, fondés sur la confiance, en sont ébranlés. Les marchés qui font appel à la confiance disparaissent parce que l’autoprotection y est trop chère et la con – naissance personnelle des autres parties prati – quement impossible. La question cruciale aujourd’hui est donc le déclin de la con – fiance dans le système financier. no31-32-OK.indd 92 03.09.2009 07:44:33 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur 93 Although financial problems are closely related to correcting market imbalance, the crucial issue today is the failing trust and confidence in the financial system. No matter how much money the government might pour into the banks; no matter how strongly it will support market in – stitutions and large corporations that borrowed more than they can repay, these actions are insufficient to restore trust in the system and its intermediaries. Ironically, the gov – ernment has taken over much of the financial system and said: ‘trust me’. Yet, even those who have the cash to offer liquidity to the starving mar – kets are loath to invest in the market because they do not trust the inter – mediaries or the market prices. The U.S. government’s decision to sup – port tottering banks did not bring the stock market prices up. In fact, stock prices fell! An essential ambition There are, of course, many advis – ers and much advice on the subject of restoring trust. One source for re – search is the definition of ‘trust’. Af – ter all, trust is a belief. If trust is lost, the person or institution that wishes to restore it must offer free verifica – tion. The trusting person need not seek proof. The trusted person must offer it. In general, moving towards more stable trust and honesty re – quires changes in the culture; and changes in the culture require alter – ing aspirations and assumptions on acceptable behaviour. We need to change a number of fundamental beliefs. First, benefits to individuals or to a few corporations do not nec – essarily constitute benefits to larger groups of individuals and the coun – try. What is good for General Motors is not necessarily good for America. There is a balance between individu – al and societal benefits. The balance cannot always be achieved by self- interest and conflict but most often, by a commitment to the other party’s benefits. This commitment is ex – pressed by honesty and trustworthi – ness. This is where the culture must lead if we are to restore trust in the financial system and the economy. So here I make a leap to aspira – tions. We may have to compromise on the details. But the one thing on which we may not compromise is the ambition to become an honest society. This ambition is an idea, yet it can shape and become a building block of our culture. Being an idea, it is fully within our control – powerful and empowering. It may be a Utopia, which we cannot reach. But it can guide our daily life. Let the social pressures shame and prevent people from bragging about their gains at the expense of others. Let people who have abused trust be shunned. Do not let them be our leaders. Follow those who are not afraid to say: ‘I try my best to be honest. I want to live in a society of honest persons. I will not take advantage of others even when I can, and even when it is perhaps permissible under the law, and even if I give more than I can take’. This would enable our society and econ – omy to become far more prosperous and secure than they are today. • La confiance est une conviction. Si elle est perdue, la personne ou l’institution qui veut la rétablir doit donner un accès immédiat aux données concernant les opérateurs. La per – sonne qui se risque à nouveau sur le marché ne doit pas avoir à chercher des garanties. On doit les lui offrir. La seule chose pour laquelle il ne faut accepter aucun com – promis est l’ambition de devenir une société honnête. Cette ambi – tion peut guider notre vie de tous les jours. Il faut qu’une pression sociale s’exerce pour faire honte à ceux qui se vantent de leurs gains réalisés sur le dos des autres. Il faut bannir les gens qui ont abusé de la confiance des autres. Ne les laissons pas être nos leaders ! TRUST, HONESTY AND ETHICS IN BUSINESS no31-32-OK.indd 93 03.09.2009 07:44:33 Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur Document téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info – – – 68.194.54.57 – 14/02/2018 05h40. © De Boeck Supérieur